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The Rise of Political-Economy Analysis for Development Assistance 
Political-economy analysis has been a favourite instrument among donors of development 
aid since roughly the turn of the century. The usefulness of such forms of analysis has been 
emphasised because donors realised that their focus on formal aspects of the social and 
political organisation of countries caused them to overlook important elements of the 
‘political economy’ of these countries.3 As a result of this, political and governance reform 
programmes, which had become part and parcel of the agenda of development under the 
Post-Washington Consensus, turned out to be much less effective than anticipated. 
 The call for donor agencies to ‘look behind the façade’4 of formal institutions in 
developing countries has thus come as part of the aid effectiveness agenda. It was argued 
that the effectiveness of development assistance policies would be enhanced if the realities of 
social and political power structures in developing countries were mapped and fed into the 
design of governance reforms targeting those countries. A more or less tacit assumption in 
this approach was that political-economy analysis would enable donors to identify potential 
pockets of resistance against the reforms that donors were advocating – hence improving the 
chances of getting reforms accepted.5 
 In this book we have discussed various examples of political-economy analysis, including 
the Drivers of Change approach developed by the UK’s Department for International 
Development in the early 2000s, the Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis adopted 
by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007, and the World Bank’s approach to the 
political economy of policy reform and its problem-driven governance and political-
economy analysis, presented in 2008-9. Throughout the book, we have also paid attention to 
the Demand for Good Governance programme, implemented under the aegis of the World 
Bank, with active participation of Australia’s aid agency, AusAID. 
 A key element of most or all of the approaches to political-economy analysis appeared to 
be their identification of different ‘layers’ of analysis: below the daily events in every political 
                                                     
3 Cf. Copestake, J. and Williams, R. (2012) The Evolving Art of Political Economy Analysis: Unlocking Its 
Practical Potential through a More Interactive Approach, Oxford: Oxford Policy Management. 
4 This term is used in, among others, Harth, K. and Waltmans, J. (2007), ‘Behind the Façade: The 
Informal Reality in Developing Countries’, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Rich Menu for the Poor: 
Food for Thought on Effective Aid Policies, Essay 3. 
5 This approach comes out very clearly in: Fritz, V., Kaiser, K. and Levy, B. (2009) Problem-Driven 
Governance and Political Economy Analysis: Good Practice Framework, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
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system, there are the institutional arrangements (the ‘rules of the game’) that impact on day-
to-day politics by influencing the policy options that politicians have. Even more 
fundamental are so-called ‘structural’ elements, which relate to the history of the country 
under discussion, its natural resource endowment, and the power distribution over social 
groups. Improvement of the understanding of the rules of the game, and more 
fundamentally even the structural features of developing countries, is believed to be the key 
contribution made by political-economy analysis.6 
 
The Problem with Political-Economy Analysis 
Previous chapters have identified several problems, at different levels, in relation to the 
political-economy analysis advocated by many development agencies. First, we identified 
problems in the design and application of the instruments that had been developed by 
several aid agencies. Secondly, we pointed at the difficulty involved in the translation of the 
lessons of the political-economy analyses into concrete policies of reform. Thirdly, we 
indicated how the core assumptions of most of political-economy analysis revolt against the 
correct identification of reform coalitions in the developing countries that are targeted by the 
aid agencies. 
 
The Political Economy of Donor Agencies 
A first major problem with the recent implementation of political-economy analysis is related 
to the way in which such analysis is embedded within the set of instruments that is available 
to donor agencies. Essentially, this problem calls for a political-economy of donors 
themselves, as the interests of and conflicts within donor governments need to be understood 
to see why the implications of political-economy analysis are not likely to be followed to 
their logical conclusions. 
 We argued that donor agencies need to be perceived as specific creatures within the realm 
of government. In the words of William Easterly, donor agencies are in the business of 
                                                     
6 For instance: Warrener, D. (2004) The Drivers of Change Approach, Synthesis Paper 3, London: 
Overseas Development Institute; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008) Framework for Strategic Governance 
and Corruption Analysis (SGACA): Designing Strategic Responses Towards Good Governance, The Hague: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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‘moving money’.7 As a result of their mandate, staff incentives staff in the aid agencies are 
related, in the first place, to the disbursement of funds allocated to them for development 
projects and programmes. The everyday practice of donor agencies forces them to be more 
concerned with the implications of their ‘logical frameworks’ than with the environment 
they find themselves in. For donors, ‘doing development’ is, first and foremost, 
implementing programmes and projects 
The perceived need to spend money – for instance, increasingly through so-called budget 
support modalities, which are felt to be most in line with the objectives of the Paris 
Declaration, most notably alignment and ownership8 – can easily come into conflict with the 
conclusions derived from political-economy analysis. Recent controversies over budget 
support arrangements to regimes engaged in foreign military operations (such as Rwanda) 
or found to be practicing corruption (such as Uganda) illustrate the tensions inherent in 
contemporary policies that are subject to ‘results-based accountability’. 
Apart from the bureaucratic cross-pressures characterising donor agencies, such agencies 
are also subject to greater influences related to the role they play in their national political 
environments. Development assistance policies need to be understood as part of the foreign-
policy framework of governments. Hence, decisions on how and where to allocate aid are 
part of the foreign-policy equation. Foreign policy is generally understood as an instrument 
to further the strategic and commercial interests of countries, and development assistance 
can only escape from the foreign-policy parameters to a limited extent, as much research on 
the impact of ‘donor interests’, ‘recipient needs’ and ‘normative ideas’ on aid allocation has 
shown.9 It is small wonder that decisions on development assistance are often guided at least 
as much, or more, by perceived geostrategic and economic interests of donors as it is by their 
desire to ‘do good’ in the countries of the global South.10 Moreover, the relatively low 
position of development agencies in the pecking order of policy making reduces their 
                                                     
7 Easterly, W. (2002) ‘The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid’, 
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 5(4): 228. 
8 Cf. Molenaers, N. (2012) ‘The Great Divide? Donor Perceptions of Budget Support, Eligibility 
and Policy Dialogue, Third World Quarterly 33(5): 791-806. 
9 A good recent overview is presented in: Clist, P. (2011) ‘25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither 
Selectivity?’, World Development 39(10): 1724-1734. 
10 E.g., Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press; Van der Veen, A.M. (2011) Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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leverage in budget negotiations vis-à-vis other government departments – such as credit-
insurance agencies –, which have a much easier job in justifying their activities in terms of 
the contribution to the national interest. 
Likewise, the relative weakness of development agencies is observable in the application 
of political conditionalities related, among other things, to human rights norms. In this vein, 
the short-lived freezing of the UK’s aid disbursement to Rwanda over allegations that the 
Kagame government has been involved in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
may serve as an example. Although the evidence about Rwanda’s involvement was very 
stark – which prompted Germany, Sweden and The Netherlands to maintain their freeze of 
aid – the Secretary of State for International Development indicated after barely one month 
that there was sufficient proof that Rwanda had ‘engaged constructively with the peace 
process’ and that resumption of the £16 million in budget support to the country was 
therefore justified.11 
 
The Political Economy of Donor-Recipient Relations 
A second main factor impacting on the relevance of political-economy analyses is connected 
to the dynamics inherent in donor-recipient relations. The specific nature of the relationship, 
which has been defined by many as a situation of dependence, has a major impact on the 
ability of donors to influence the course of reforms in developing countries. 
 In the first place, dependence has been assumed too easily to imply a complete 
renunciation of recipient governments to the policy objectives of the donors. Such an 
interpretation of donor-recipient relationships does not pay sufficient attention to the tools 
that recipient government possess to serve their own interests. The powerful instruments of 
recipient governments were, of course, clearest during the Cold War, when allegiance to one 
of the superpowers brought advantages in terms of foreign aid allocations. Yet, also after the 
end of the Cold War, recipient governments have retained important means to ensure the 
interest of donor governments. Apart from the obvious strategic interest of the West in 
particular natural resources – now more and more subject to competition with emerging 
                                                     
11 Blair, D. (2012) ‘Britain Accused of “Disastrous Signal” by Resuming over Rwanda Aid’, The 
Telegraph, 5 September, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/ 
9523969/Britain-accused-of-disastrous-signal-by-resuming-over-Rwanda-aid.html (accessed 20 March 
2013). 
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economies such as China – recipient governments have played out the card of ‘the politics of 
the mirror’. In the rather cynical words of Chabal and Daloz, which seem to have mileage in 
relation not just to Africa but to regimes across the developing world more broadly: 
 
This consists essentially in addressing the foreign ‘other’ – in this case, potential aid 
donors – in the language that is most congenial and, crucially, most easily reinforces the 
belief that they (outsiders) understand what Africa needs. Thus it was that Africans 
conspired to support the colonial notion that they were all divided into discrete and 
identifiable ‘tribes’ and, later, convinced their colonial masters that they intended to run 
the politics of their newly independent countries on the principles of multi-party 
parliamentary systems. Thus it was too that some African leaders became overnight the 
proponents of scientific socialism or adhered wholeheartedly to the proposals for 
development projects which came their way.12 
 
 Next to this, dependence is sometimes translated into the assumption that reforms of 
governance regimes can be used to neutralise vested interests by installing technocratic, ‘a-
political’ rule. Thus, market-oriented precepts of public sector reform, performance-based 
financing and results-based accountability – which are all related, in one way or another, to 
New Public Management or what Cooke and Dar, among others, have called the ‘new 
development management’13 – are used to legitimise governance reform as conditionalities to 
development assistance. In many cases, however, donor agencies and reform-resistant 
power-holders end up being ‘strange bedfellows’.14 Reform programmes that seem to 
comply with the demands issued by donors may relatively easily be hijacked by special 
interest groups, which appear to be playing along with the donors but are mainly motivated 
by their own interests. The way in which the later ‘oligarchs’ benefited from privatisation 
                                                     
12 Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.-P. (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Oxford: James Currey, 
p. 117. 
13 Cooke, B. and Dar, S. (2008) ‘Introduction: The New Development Management’, in S. Dar and B. 
Cooke (eds) The New Development Management: Critiquing the Dual Modernization, London: Zed Books, 
pp. 1–17; Gulrajani, N. (2011) ‘Transcending the Great Foreign Aid Debate: Managerialism, 
Radicalism and the Search for Aid Effectiveness’, Third World Quarterly 32(2): 199-216. 
14 Cf. Robison, R. (2009) ‘Strange Bedfellows: Political Alliances in the Making of Neo-liberal 
Governance’, in Hout, W. and Robison, R. (eds) Governance and the Depoliticisation of Development, 
London: Routledge, pp. 15-28. 
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policies in Russia in the 1990s is probably the starkest examples of how reform programmes 
are seized to serve the interests of particular elites. Similar, possibly less extreme but very 
likely equally devastating, examples can be found in parts of the developing world, such as 
in the cases of Cambodia and Indonesia that were discussed in chapter 6. 
 
The Political Economy of Reform Coalitions 
The third major problem concerning donors’ political-economy analysis that emanated from 
our analysis relates to the nature of reform and the driving forces behind the establishment 
of reform coalitions in developing countries. Here, one of the most important issues that was 
highlighted above concerns the assumption that development can be defined in terms of 
‘public goods’ characteristics. The assumption seems to be that Pareto-optimal solutions can 
be found in development strategies if donors, in cooperation with recipient governments, 
apply the correct technical instruments to bring about development. Poverty reduction, as 
the main target of contemporary development polices, can thus be perceived as non-
exclusive and non-rivalrous – and thus subsumed under the public goods framework – since 
it actually makes everyone better-off.15 
 Our contention throughout this book has been that this understanding of development is 
essentially a-political, since it fails to recognise that easy, Pareto-optimal outcomes are not so 
obvious. Development is, in our view, a conflict-ridden phenomenon. The main reason for 
dissenting with the optimistic assessment of donor agencies is that development presupposes 
the existence of a particular institutional order, which benefits some social-economic groups 
more than others. The spreading of the fruits of development more generally – that is, to 
groups that have traditionally been marginalised and disenfranchised – would essentially 
imply a restructuring of the institutional order. We argue that groups who have traditionally 
benefited from the existing social, economic and political institutions will perceive change as 
inimical to their interests, and thus will attempt to ward off reform. The restructuring of the 
institutional order is an inherently political process – understood in the classical Lasswellian 
                                                     
15 This seems to be the implication of the UNDP’s work on global public goods, though this conclusion 
remains largely implicit. See Kapstein, E.B. (1999) ‘Distributive Justice as an International Public Good: 
A Historical Perspective’, in Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M.A. (eds) Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 88-115. 
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sense of the process that determines who gets what, when and how16 – and cannot, therefore, 
be seen as a merely technical undertaking, which produces easy efficiency-optimising 
solutions. 
 The main flaw of mainstream political economy, which is intimately connected to the a-
political understanding of development, is that the political process can be understood in 
liberal/pluralist terms. The pluralist theory of politics, which sees the political process as an 
essentially benign struggle for power among groups, is insufficiently able to understand the 
difficulty of the marginalised and disenfranchised in getting access to the political arena in 
the first place. As a result of the pluralist bias, conventional political-economy approaches 
assume that governance reform can be achieved by engaging with enlightened technocrats, 
who can be won over to the side of the well-intended donors by promising development 
assistance. 
 The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP), which was established in July 2009 and is 
funded by the Australian government with the help of other donor agencies,17 is an example 
of an approach that aims to achieve governance reform for development purposes. The DLP 
chooses an explicitly political starting point for its approach to governance reform,18 but is 
clearly buying in to the pluralist assumptions underlying much of today’s political-economy 
analysis. As argued by Leftwich and Hogg in a background paper for the programme, the 
main challenges for achieving economic growth and social development in developing 
countries are ‘collective action problems. If these problems are to be resolved, enough 
leaders, elites and reform agents – often with different initial interests and coming from 
                                                     
16 Lasswell, H.D. (1951) ‘Politics: Who Gets What, When, How’ (orig. 1936), in The Political Writings of 
Harold D. Lasswell, Glencoe: Free Press, pp. 295-264. The first sentence of Lasswell’s work is: ‘The study 
of politics is the study of influence and the influential’. 
17 See http://www.dlprog.org/contents/about-us/governance.php. 
18 The DLP defines politics as ‘all the activities of conflict, negotiation and co-operation which occur 
when people with different interests, ideas, power and influence have not only to shape and abide by 
common institutions, but also to take decisions about how resources are to be used and distributed 
and about how power is to be gained and used’. See Leftwich, A. and Hogg, S. (2011) The 
Developmental Leadership Program: Overview and Objectives, Developmental Leadership Program 
Background Paper 05, p. 2, 
http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/Public_Folder/2_Background_Papers/Overview_and_ 
Objectives.pdf. 
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different sectors – have to work collectively and cooperatively’.19 In the view of Leftwich and 
Hogg, many developing countries lack leaders with ‘wider “national” goals’; yet ‘where 
enough leaders and elites are able to generate positive “synergies” within and between the 
interests, organizations and institutions of both the state and the private sector, on the basis 
of shared social purposes, they are able to form “developmental”, “growth” or “reform” 
coalitions, capable of devising or reforming institutions which promote economic growth 
and social development across a range of sectors and challenges’.20 
 In a similar vein, the World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance programme focuses on 
different lessons from political-economy analyses. In this programme, the focus is not so 
much on the elites, rather on the impact of civil society as a mechanism to hold governments 
accountable and achieve better development outcomes. As the World Bank’s website 
describes the aims of the programme: 
 
‘Demand for Good Governance’ (DFGG) refers to the ability of citizens, civil society 
organizations and other non state actors to hold the state accountable and make it 
responsive to their needs. DFGG encompasses initiatives that focus on citizens as the 
ultimate stakeholders and include activities relating to information disclosure, 
demystification and dissemination; beneficiary/user participation and consultation; 
complaints handling; and independent and/or participatory monitoring.  … DFGG aims 
to strengthen the capacity of NGOs, the media, local communities, and the private sector 
to hold authorities accountable for better development results. DFGG activities include 
development approaches that focus on citizens as the ultimate stakeholders for better 
governance. DFGG mechanisms can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or 
both but very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom-up.21 
 
 Our structural political-economy perspective rejects this conflict-free conception of 
development. Rather, we have defined development as a permanent process of institutional 
                                                     
19 Leftwich, A. and Hogg, S. (2007) The Case for Leadership and the Primacy of Politics in Building Effective 
States, Institutions and Governance for Sustainable Growth and Social Development, Developmental 
Leadership Program Background Paper 01, p. 5, http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/Public_Folder/ 
2_Background_Papers/Leaders,_Elites_and_Coalitions.pdf. 
20 Ibid. 
21 World Bank, ‘What is Demand for Good Governance’, http://go.worldbank.org/7OGYRXOG50. 
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restructuring, with the aim of achieving resource redistribution. This process, which requires 
the giving up of certain privileges by particular elites in favour of the poor, involves conflict. 
The reform of institutions, if seriously taken up as an objective by development agencies, will 
require these agencies to get enmeshed in the political struggles that result from the expected 
opposition of (parts of) the elite that do not wish to give up their privileges. 
 
The Alternative: Structural Political Economy and the Politics of (Structural) Reform 
The structural political-economy perspective that we have been advocating calls for a 
reorientation of the approach to governance reform. Nowhere is the implication of the 
reorientation clearer than in the approach to the politics of reform and the identification of 
reform coalitions. We do not start from the assumed objectives of particular elites, as is done 
in the Developmental Leadership Program, or from the possible counterweights that can be 
organised through civil society action, as assumed in the Demand for Good Governance 
programme. Rather, we start from the identification of sets of elites in relation to their 
position in the national structure of power. Our assumption has been throughout that a 
useful way to determine power positions is by relating these to some sort of material basis – 
be it their ownership of capital, their access to natural resources or their command of the 
strong arms of the state. Existing governance arrangements work in the interests of the 
dominant power holders, while subordinate groups (the poor, indigenous and other 
minority groups, in many cases also women) are marginalised and generally fail to get access 
to the formal decision-making structures. 
 If governance reform is the purpose, then clearly reformers are the natural focus of any 
analysis. In the approach used in this book, we have distinguished among several groups of 
reformers, whom donor agencies could ally with.  A first distinction we made was between 
dedicated and tactical reformers. Dedicated reformers are those groups, from either the 
group of power holders or the marginalised sectors of society, that have a genuine interest in 
reform. Among those reformers there are idealists, who believe in long-term goals of social 
change, and pragmatists, who do not only have similar long-term aims, but also consider the 
importance of achieving short-term improvements, even if that would require them to 
compromise on some of the longer-term objectives. Tactical reformers are in essence 
opportunists, who see that the forming of alliances with donors can bring them greater 
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advantages than the support of the ruling groups. The long-term objectives of the 
opportunists are not so much a radical transformation of the existing social, economic and 
political order, but they have a short-term interest in some of the advantages that the alliance 
with the donors may offer them, either in terms of resources, political exposure or prestige. 
 The types of alliances depend on the nature of reform-oriented groups. Very likely, the 
likelihood of success of reforms sponsored by donors is influenced by the type of alliance 
that can be forged with reform-oriented groups, as well as by the weight that such groups 
can assemble for reform. The relation among types of reformers, types of alliances and likely 
outcomes is given schematically in table 1. 
 
Table 1: The politics of reform alliances 
Types of reformers Types of alliance Likely outcome 
Idealists: interested in reform 
that advances long-term 
social change 
 
Form dedicated alliances only 
with ideologically likeminded 
actors; likely to reject tactical 
alliances 
 
Success to be expected only in case 
of ability to cause social revolution 
(Example: Khomeini-type 
‘mobilisation of the masses’) 
 
Pragmatists: interested in 
long-term social change but 
also in short-term gains 
 
Form both dedicated and 
tactical alliances 
Success dependent on mobilisation 
of anti-regime forces. Likely to lead 
to intra-regime struggle for power, 
and possibly political instability 
(Example: Democratisation in 
developing countries) 
 
Opportunists: commitment is 
contingent and tactical, as 
interests are short-term and 
self-interested, and long-term 
goals are unrelated to reform 
agendas 
Form tactical alliances Change of rulers and rules rather 
than change of regime and 
constitution (Example: Arab Spring in 
Egypt and Tunisia). Defection likely 
if reform is no longer seen as useful. 
Opportunities for improving the 
situation of marginalised groups 
 
The main implication of the approach outlined is that outside forces are dependent on 
domestic alliances if they wish to influence the direction of any reform process. For donor 
agencies, this implies that they would need to take sides if they are truly interested in 
making an impact on governance reform. Thus, we have argued in this book, a strategic 
assessment of the power of reform alliances, as well as of anti-reform opposition alliances, is 
required. 
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 Given that different types of reformers are likely to engage in different strategies for 
governance reform, the options for donor agencies that wish to support reform-oriented 
groups can be ranged on a continuum. On one side of the continuum is support to idealist 
reformers in a declaratory way and the provision of financial support for those reformers to 
organise. While such an approach will enable donors to keep their hands clean, the above 
assessment also indicates that the likelihood of such a strategy to install reforms is rather 
slim. On the opposite side of the continuum is the situation where donors are required to 
make dirty hands by siding with opportunist elites that have been occupying roles in 
oppressive or highly corrupt regimes. Given the role of the opportunists in the national 
balance of power, the likelihood of achieving results is arguably greater – yet, such a strategy 
may be resisted because of the fallout on the reputation of those donor governments that side 
with representatives of regimes that are considered objectionable by their domestic 
constituencies. The case studies presented in earlier chapters illustrate that, in attempting to 
duck the issue, donors often end up failing to produce any concrete positive reforms for the 
poor and marginalised at all. 
 The argument may be illustrated by focusing on the possible approach of donor agencies 
to the promotion of democratisation processes that are aspired by certain political groups or 
are actually underway in authoritarian developing countries. Democratisation, understood 
as the increasing influence of greater parts of the population on decision making, is likely to 
be resisted by the elites that are in control of an autocratic regime. The ruling elites, who are 
in possession of the main power resources (such as economic assets or control of security 
forces), will feel threatened in their power position as a result of the claims to greater 
influence by marginalised groups, particularly if the latter constitute the vast majority of the 
population. The role of the middle classes in most developing countries is still likely to be 
limited, though growing as a result of greater economic dynamism over the past decade. As 
a result, the potential for change resulting from mobilising the middle classes can be 
assumed to be relatively small. 
Our structural political-economy analysis may offer the tools to help in uncovering the 
dynamics involved in the democratisation process. Next to the reform-resisting ruling 
powers, several groups are likely to be identified with the help of the typology of reformers 
sketched above. Groups pressuring for democratisation because of ideological convictions 
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belong to our category of idealists. They support fundamental, long-term democratic 
reforms, aimed at providing more opportunities to the poor and marginalised for influencing 
the outcome of political processes. The pragmatists are those groups who are in favour of 
democratising the polity, but also value the introduction of short-term improvements in the 
life of the poorer parts of the population, brought about for instance through the adoption of 
certain redistributive social policies. Pragmatist reformers would be willing to support 
alliances that aim to get social policies adopted, whey consider these as the best approach in 
the given situation. The opportunists are those parts of the ruling class, who have an interest 
in removing the clique that is in control of the state, but are not fundamentally concerned 
about democratising the political system. They may support reform, for instance aimed at 
the introduction of social policies or limited democracy, in order to weaken the grip to power 
of the incumbent autocrats. 
Donor agencies interested in contributing to democratic reforms should aim to build 
alliances with those groups that are most likely to produce the desired outcome. Given the 
general weakness of the idealist reformers, supporting pro-democracy idealist groups may 
be morally comforting, but politically ineffective. A different approach may, therefore, be 
required to install change in the political system of the developing country concerned. The 
building of an alliance with pragmatists, who are reform-minded, and opportunists may turn 
out to be the only way to create some sort of pro-poor political reform – even though such 
change may fall short of the original aims of democratisation. In the end, donors may have to 
get their hands dirty by providing support to the opportunist elites, whose main objective is 
to replace the incumbents in power, in order to improve the plight of the poorest segments in 
a developing country. The balance of power between the pragmatists and opportunists will 
ultimately determine the extent of the reforms; external donor agencies will be able to exert 
only partial influence on the exact outcome of the reform process, and will need to acquiesce 
in their fairly limited role. 
 
Development Agencies and Political-Economy Analysis: The Road to Nowhere? 
Does the analysis that was presented in this book then leave us without any hope as to the 
applicability of political-economy analysis as an instrument for bringing about governance 
reform in developing countries? While the approach outlined above does certainly give rise 
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to a fair degree of scepticism, there is probably no need to be entirely negative about the 
leverage of donor agencies and see political-economy approaches as no more than a purely 
academic exercise. 
 The first lesson that, we feel, can be learnt from a serious engagement with political-
economy analysis is that development should not be understood rather naïvely as a process 
that will lead to improvements in the lives of all parts of a population over a relatively short 
time span. Although it is tempting to think about development in largely positive terms, 
everyone involved in the aid industry should recognise that development brings about a 
conflictual process of reordering economic and social relations. As such, development is not 
a conflict-free public good, but is inevitably political in nature.  
Giving examples from the presently ‘developed’ countries, many people would be 
convinced of the benefits that development has brought in terms of the level of wealth, 
health and education. This we would certainly not deny, but the plight of ‘underclasses’ in 
those same societies indicates that the fruits of development do not automatically ‘trickle 
down’ to all individuals, and that exclusion mechanisms are still very powerful even in the 
most developed countries. The ‘discovery’ of the urban underclass of New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina hit the southern United States in 2005 brought home to many that not all 
US citizens had shared in the benefits of economic growth. Likewise, repeated reports on 
undocumented migrants in European countries indicate the presence of an underclass even 
in inclusive welfare states.22 These examples are illustrative of the persistently political 
nature of development at all levels of economic progress. 
 The awareness that development must be conceived in outright political terms, 
necessitates the adoption of a political-economy perspective, which zooms in on the 
resources and instruments that people have, or lack, to obtain a fairer share of social wealth. 
Also, such political-economy analysis emphasises the various dimensions of governance 
reform that can be laid out. Using the frequently applied distinction among the ‘here and 
now’,  the ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘structural factors’ that is chosen in various donor 
                                                     
22 E.g. Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), ‘PICUM’s Main 
Concerns about the Fundamental Rights of Undocumented Migrants in Europe 2010’, 
http://picum.org/picum.org/uploads/publication/Annual%20Concerns%202010%20EN.pdf. 
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instruments for political-economy analysis, we can possibly draw out some lessons for 
attempts to bring about governance reform in developing countries. 
The nature and extent of governance reform differs across the various political-economy 
layers. At the level of the ‘here and now’, reform relates to a change of leadership. The ‘rules 
of the game’ are related to a deeper layer of countries’ political economy and here 
governance reform would imply changes in the constitutional order. At the most 
fundamental political-economy layer, where the ‘structural factors’ are located, reform 
would address issues of distribution of resources, inequality, the adverse treatment and 
discrimination of parts of the population, et cetera. Moving from the ‘here and now’ towards 
the ‘structural factors’, the social impact of governance reform becomes more profound and 
obtains a more clearly political dimension (in the sense that it has an impact on ‘who gets 
what, when, how?’) – thus, the deeper the political-economy layer, the more conflictual 
governance reforms are likely to be. 
 On the basis of the cases that were discussed in this book, we may conclude that many 
donor agencies, despite their rhetorical commitment, generally shy away from getting 
involved in ‘deeper’ governance reform processes. The main reasons for their difficulty in 
engaging with politics, as described in earlier chapters, derive from the incentive structure 
and the development-oriented outlook that characterise donor agencies. These donor 
agencies will likely use political-economy analysis mainly at the rhetorical level, and will 
apply the knowledge primarily for preparing their staff working in aid-recipient countries. 
For them, political-economy analysis will not have a great impact on their policies vis-à-vis 
their partner countries. In this case, the question in the title of this chapter should be 
answered positively: in terms of political-economy analysis, those donor agencies find 
themselves on the road to nowhere. 
 Donor agencies that are serious about the need for governance reform and wish to engage 
with the political marginalisation of the poor in developing countries may want to proceed 
on the road to political-economy analysis, and actively apply the insights derived from this 
type of analysis. The concrete use of political-economy analysis has the capacity to make aid 
more effective as well as more directly beneficial to the poor. The discussion in this book has 
pointed out that in many cases pro-poor policies require a critical attitude versus the ruling 
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elite in developing countries, as their approaches tend to be quite harmful to the cause of 
poor and marginalised segments of the population. 
 The approach sketched in previous chapters would guide donors in searching for 
reformers who are able and willing to engage seriously with pro-poor policies. Idealist 
reformers are probably the easiest to identify, but they are also the least influential among 
reform-oriented groups. Idealists will be found in certain civil-society organisations, and 
empowering such organisations may be a first strategy that donor agencies can adopt. Their 
activities would very likely be twofold. In the first place, civil-society groups would be 
engaged in advocacy for the cause of the poor and marginalised. The objective of supporting 
such groups would be to enhance awareness among larger parts of the population of the 
living conditions and limited access of the poor, in order to influence policy making in the 
longer run. In the second place, civil-society organisations would be recruited for the 
implementation of programmes and project aimed at the poorest parts of society. 
 Political-economy analysis would also provide development agencies with a better 
understanding of the location and the nature of opportunist groups, as well as the way to 
win them for the cause of pro-poor governance reform. Such opportunists may be tempted to 
engage in tactical alliances with donors if their short-term interests run parallel with those of 
the aid agencies. Such a situation may exist when a specific part of the elite notices that its 
engagement with the pro-poor policies of the donors will enhance its own political power 
base among the poor. This could be true, for instance, for elites originating from the part of a 
developing country where many of the poor are concentrated. Donors need to be aware of 
the tactical nature of alliances with opportunist reformers, and of the risk that the 
opportunist elites may rather easily shift allegiance away from the donor agencies if the 
alliance is no longer considered to be beneficial to them. 
 The relative ineffectiveness of dedicated alliances with idealists and the expected 
volatility of tactical alliances with opportunists indicate that the building of alliances with so-
called pragmatist reformers is preferable. Unlike idealists, pragmatists are not only 
interested in fundamental reforms, but also in piecemeal changes into what they feel is the 
right direction. Different from opportunists, the engagement of pragmatist reformers with 
donors is not just tactical and self-serving. Pragmatists are very likely the prime mover for 
governance reform in developing countries. Political-economy analysis may help in 
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identifying pragmatist groups in or associated with the elite who are supportive of the pro-
poor governance reforms supported by donor agencies. As the pragmatists’ agenda may 
conflict with the interests of other parts of the elite, who are primarily interested in 
maintaining the status quo and their own position in power, the engagement of donor 
agencies with the pragmatists may result in a struggle for power within the regime and, at 
least in the short run, increased political instability. 
 The outcome of the political struggle within the regime is not certain, and depends on the 
political resources that pro- and anti-reform groups manage to mobilise. It is likely that 
donor agencies will come to be seen as part of the political struggle, as they take sides with 
the pragmatists who push for governance reform. Committed donors, who see the battle 
against forms of patronage, nepotism and corruption as inherent to development, will need 
to be prepared to support the cause of the reform-oriented pragmatists and risk a 
deterioration of relations with those at the helm of the state. When engaging with 
governance reform in developing countries, donor agencies may come under attack from 
domestic constituencies which wish to maintain ‘good relations’ with specific foreign 
regimes for strategic or commercial reasons. The need to navigate in rough waters both at 
home and abroad obviously requires that donor agencies can think and act politically, and 
persevere in their chosen strategies. The tendency of these agencies to minimise risks, as well 
as their relatively low place in the pecking order of foreign policy making, are not the best 
ingredients for the assertive pursuit of development strategies. This is indeed why most of 
the aid industry is on the road to nowhere as far as political-economy analysis is concerned. 
